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Are Courts Taking Internet Threats Seriously
Enough? An Analysis of True Threats Transmitted
Over the Internet, as Interpreted in
United States v. Carmichael
Amy E. McCann*
[T]he Internet... is a medium for the instantaneous transmission of
ideas free of the web of social controls. Ideas on television or radio, or
in books and magazines, emanate from corporate offices. Ideas on the
Net emanate from a million servers worldwide. Ideas do not get in or out
of those corporate offices, let alone make it into the broadcast or the
publication, without someone's strict review and approval. Ideas spread
across the Internet like viruses through a crowded city.1
I. Introduction
Imagine that you have acted as an informant for the government in a
drug conspiracy and money laundering case. Being an upstanding, law-
abiding citizen, you consider it your duty to ensure that the American
criminal justice system works and that the streets will be a little safer for
your children. While being an informant is always slightly risky and
dangerous, imagine how you would feel if you found out that there was a
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1. Jonathan Wallace, Why the Internet is "Dangerous," 1 THE ETHICAL SPECTACLE
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website posted on the Internet that had your name and photo on a
WANTED poster. The criminal defendant in the case in which you acted
as an informant had created a website to look like a WANTED poster,
such as those used in the Old West, that featured your name and photo,
as well as the names and photos of other informants and Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents involved in the case. How would
you feel about testifying in the case now that anyone with Internet
access, including those other people involved in the drug conspiracy or
personal friends of the defendant, could see that you were the one who
"snitched"? Would it make you less likely to testify, as well as less
likely to help the government in future cases? Would it make you fear
for your safety, as well as the safety of your family?
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama,
Northern Division, determined that in that very situation, you would not
feel threatened.2 In United States v. Carmichael, the court allowed such
a website to remain on the Internet, holding that it was not a true threat,
and therefore constituted protected speech under the First Amendment.3
The court applied the strictly objective test of the Eleventh Circuit to
determine that the website was not a true threat.4
This Case Note will demonstrate why courts should change their
true threat analysis under the First Amendment in the context of the
Internet, so as to incorporate a subjective element that focuses on the
listener (reader). This new media, which the courts have only recently
begun to analyze, is quite different from other traditional media. The
Internet can be accessed by virtually anyone around the world, and must
be subjected to a different analysis than an advertisement in the local
paper. While the speaker's intent is important to the true threat analysis,
the subjective fear caused in the listener or reader of a website should be
considered as well.
Part II of this Case Note will examine the history of unprotected
speech under the First Amendment, focusing on the tests developed by
the United States Supreme Court for evaluating true threats. Part III will
focus on the more recent cases that have begun to develop the law of true
threats and electronic media, that covers both electronic mail (email) and
the Internet. Part IV will discuss the Carmichael case and its holding.
Part V will discuss the merits of the Carmichael decision and why it was
wrongly decided, as well as illustrate why a more subjective analysis of
2. United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1270 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
3. Id. See infra note 5.
4. Id. at 1280-81.
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true threats in the context of the Internet is necessary. Finally, Part VI
will describe the proposed test that should be used to analyze threats over
the Internet.
II. The History of Unprotected Speech Under the First Amendment:
True Threats
The first significant Supreme Court cases analyzing what speech did
not deserve protection under the First Amendment 5 arose in the early part
of the twentieth century. In Schenck v. United States,6 Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes stated that whether speech is protected depends upon
the circumstances in which it is spoken.7 Justice Holmes laid out the
famous "clear and present danger" test, stating,
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.8
The Supreme Court adopted another test in Gitlow v. New York,9 in
which the Court decided that the defendant's "Left Wing Manifesto"
advocating a communist revolution was not protected speech.10 In
establishing the "bad tendency test," the Court stated that freedom of
speech does not protect attempts to subvert the government or disturb the
peace. 11
A. Developing the True Threat Framework
Over thirty years later, the Supreme Court began interpreting threats
under the First Amendment. There are many reasons why true threats
are not protected speech. Some of the most important include protecting
people from the fear of violence, preventing the disruption that this fear
5. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
6. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
7. Id. at 52.
8. Id.
9. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
10. Id. at 672.
11. Id. at 667.
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of violence causes, preventing crimes by incarcerating those who have
made threats that they are likely to carry out, and to prevent people from
being forced to act against their will in response to threats.
12
The first case to address the "true threat" issue was Watts v. United
States.13 During a public rally at the Washington Monument on August
27, 1966, Watts, an 18-year-old man, stated, "If they ever make me carry
a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.' 14 The Supreme
Court reversed his conviction for threatening the President because this
kind of "political hyperbole" did not fit into the statute, 15 which required
a willful intent to carry out the threat.' 6 When the threat is one that
would be carried out by the speaker, the Court looks to the context, the
nature of the statement, and the reaction of the listeners to determine if
the speech is a true threat.' 7  In holding that "a threat must be
distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech," the Court
established the principle that true threats constitute an exception to First
Amendment protection.' 
8
After Watts, the Court examined a slightly different type of threat in
Brandenburg v. Ohio:" when the speech incites others to commit
20
violence, rather than simply the speaker carrying out the threat. In
Brandenburg, the defendant, a leader of a local Ku Klux Klan group,
advocated hate crimes at a rally of other group members.2' A large
wooden cross was burned at the rally and several attendees had firearms
in their possession.22 The Court held that the First Amendment protects
advocacy of illegal and violent action unless it is intended to produce, or
is likely to cause, "imminent lawless action."23 Here, the speech was
protected because it was mere abstract teaching of violence, and not the
actual preparation for impending violence.24
12. Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 283, 290-91 (2001).
13. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
14. Id. at 706.
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 871 (2000) (dealing with threats made against the President).
16. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-08.
17. Id. at 708.
18. Id. at707.
19. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
20. Id. at 447.
21. Id. at 445-46.
22. Id. at 445.
23. Id. at 447.
24. Id. at 448.
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In the 1975 case of Rogers v. United States,25 the Supreme Court
was presented with another true threat case, but again declined to
establish a clear test for their analysis. In Rogers, the defendant was
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) for making threats against the life of
President Richard Nixon.26 Rogers, an alcoholic, had stumbled into a
Holiday Inn while intoxicated and, after accosting some of the
customers, stated that he was "going to go to Washington to 'whip
Nixon's ass' or to 'kill him in order to save the United States.'
27
Although the Court had originally granted certiorari in Rogers in
order to resolve the circuit split in dealing with true threats, the Court
never reached that issue.28 Because the Court found that a prejudicial
error had occurred at the trial level in regard to communications with the
jury, the conviction was reversed without discussion of the threat. 29 In
fact, it was only discussed in Justice Marshall's concurring opinion.
30
Justice Marshall's concurrence, joined by Justice Douglas, called for a
subjective element in the true threat analysis.31 Justice Marshall's
analysis focused on whether the defendant intended that his statement be
taken as a threat, even if the defendant had no intent of actually carrying
out the threat.32 Justice Marshall felt that a completely objective test
would endanger free speech rights when there was no indication that the
speaker meant the words to convey a threat.3 3
B. Defining "True Threat"
The Supreme Court has clearly established that true threats
comprise unprotected speech. However, the question remains as to what
exactly a true threat is. The Supreme Court has never established a
definition of true threat,34 and the circuits are split on what test should be
used to analyze true threats.35 Most circuits have an objective test that
25. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975).
26. Id. at 36.
27. Id. at 41-42.
28. Id. at 36.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 41 (Marshall, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 47.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 47-48.
34. United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
35. Scott Hammack, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-line
Requires a Modification of the Courts' Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65, 78 (2002).
2006]
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focuses on the listener's interpretation of the speech; the Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held that a true threat
exists when a reasonable person would construe the speech to be a
threat.36 The Eleventh Circuit also employs an objective test37 that will
be discussed in greater detail in Part IV. Two circuits, the First and
Ninth, employ a more subjective test, 38 holding that the test is whether a
reasonable speaker would foresee that the listener would interpret the
speech as a threat of violence.39
III. Free Speech and the Internet
According to 2004 estimates there are over 700 million Internet
users in the world, and approximately 287,500,000 of those users are
native English speakers. 40 The Internet provides almost unlimited access
to communication of all kinds, at a low cost.4 1 Virtually anyone with
access to the Internet can publish their ideas, no matter how outrageous,
with few economic barriers or editorial control. Although this relatively
new media reaches so many people around the world, the Supreme Court
has held that speech broadcast over the Internet falls within traditional,
mainstream First Amendment analysis.42 In holding that the Internet was
not so dissimilar from other media, the Court stated, "Through the use of
chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a
voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the
use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual
36. Id. It should also be noted that these "objective" tests may vary slightly from
each other based on who exactly the "reasonable listener" is. The reasonable person
could be the speaker, the hearer, or the recipient. The recipient is the intended target of
the speech, while the hearer is simply someone who heard the speech although it was not
intended to target them. The hearer can be, but is not required to be, the recipient. See
United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549
(3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Bozeman, 495 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Fuller, 387 F.3d 643 (7th Cir.
2004); United States v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614 (10th Cir. 1984).
37. United States v. Alaboud, 347 F.3d 1293 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
38. Hammack, supra note 35, at 78. See United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6
(1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1990).
39. Hammack, supra note 35, at 78.
40. Global Reach, http://global-reach.biz/globstats/index.php3 (last visited Apr. 18,
2006).
41. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
42. Id. at 868-69. The Court stated that none of the special justifications that
support increased regulation of broadcast media by the government are present on the
Internet. Id. at 869. The Internet is not as "invasive" as television or radio. Id.
[Vol. 26:523
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can become a pamphleteer. ' 4 3 So although the Court acknowledged the
Internet's ability to augment any message, it held that the Internet should
be treated the same as a newspaper.44
But is this the correct holding? Shouldn't the Court be concerned
with the factors that distinguish the Internet from any other previous
media, including a larger audience, faster communication of information,
ease and low-cost of access, and the anonymity of both the speakers and
the recipients of the speech? Is it not reasonable to think that threats
would be amplified on the Internet because so many people can see
them?
In Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 45 the
Ninth Circuit determined that information published on a website could
be a true threat.46 On January 25, 1995, the American Coalition of Life
Activists (ACLA), an anti-abortion group, revealed its "Deadly Dozen"
poster, along with a similar website, featuring the names, pictures, and
home addresses of certain doctors who perform abortions.47 The poster
and website also offered a $5,000 reward for information that could lead
to their arrests.48 In response to the poster and website, the FBI offered
protection to the doctors listed.49 Numerous other posters and websites
followed. All resembled WANTED posters, with the words
"WANTED," "unWANTED," "Nuremberg Files," or "GUILTY... OF
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY" at the top.50 Many of the doctors
pictured were killed sometime soon after the posters began circulating,
and the surviving doctors testified that they feared for their lives.5'
The Ninth Circuit determined that a statement is a true threat "when
a reasonable person making the statement would foresee that the
statement would be interpreted by those to whom it is communicated as a
serious expression of an intent to [cause] bodily harm or assault., 52
Since ACLA was aware that a "wanted"-type poster appearing on a
43. Id. at 870.
44. Id. at 868-69.
45. Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.
2002) (en banc).
46. Id. at 1088.
47. Id. at 1064.
48. Id. at 1065.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1066.
52. Id. at 1080 (agreeing with the court's prior decision in United States v. Orozco-
Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)).
2006]
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website would likely be interpreted as a serious threat by a doctor
identified on the poster, because of the history of doctors being murdered
soon after their photos appeared on the posters, the court was satisfied
that the posters and websites constituted true threats.5 3  Since the
speakers knew that the speech would be threatening to the recipient, and
understood the significance of singling out certain doctors, the speech
was not protected.
54
IV. Case History of United States v. Carmichael
A. Facts
In November 2003, Gary Wayne George and Robert Patrick Denton
were arrested for marijuana distribution.5 They informed DEA agent
Raymond David DeJohn that Leon Carmichael, Sr. had hired them to
assist him with marijuana distribution; later that day, Carmichael's
residence was searched, and eleven duffel bags of marijuana were
found.5 - Carmichaei was arrested for drug conspiracy and muney
laundering,57 and later charged with one count of conspiracy to possess
marijuana with the intent to distribute and one count of conspiracy to
commit money laundering.
58
53. Id. at 1063.
54. Id. at 1088. It should be noted, however, that there were three dissenting
opinions written, with a total of five justices joining in them. Justice Reinhardt simply
pointed out that the anti-abortion posters were political hyperbole, vital to our democratic
system, and should be protected. Id. at 1088-89 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Justice
Kozinski felt that the court had the right test for true threats, but used it incorrectly; the
posters should be protected because there was no indication that the speaker, ACLA,
would be the one to commit or control the violence. Id. at 1089 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Justice Berzon felt that the majority let the wrenching facts in this case sway them too
much. He stated, "This case is proof positive that hard cases make bad law, and that
when the case is very hard-meaning that competing legal and moral imperatives pull
with impressive strength in opposite directions-there is the distinct danger of making
very bad law." Id. at 1101 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
55. United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d. 1267, 1270-71 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
56. Id. at 1271.
57. Id. at 1271. A detailed summary of the events leading up to the arrest of
Carmichael and his employee Freddie Williams can be found in the District Court's
decision upholding the warrantless search of Williams' home. United States v. Williams,
No. 2:03CR259-T, 2004 WL 936340 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 8, 2004).
58. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d. at 1271. Carmichael was charged under 21
U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, as well as 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Id. The relevant section of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) states, -[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to manufacture... distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
[Vol. 26:523
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A website about the case, http://www.carmichaelcase.com, 59
appeared in December 2003.60 In or around April 2004, the website was
altered to its current format, which is that of a WANTED poster.
61
Below the word "WANTED" are the words, "Information on these
Informants and Agents., 62 The informants listed were Denton, George,
Sherry D. Pettis, and Walace Salery; the agents listed were DeJohn,
Thomas Halasz, Devin Whittle, and Robert Greenwood.63 Photos of all
eight people appeared above their names.64
Beneath the eight photos was the statement, "If you have any
information about these informants and agents, regardless of how
insignificant you may feel it is, Please contact," followed by contact
information for Carmichael's attorney. 65 There was also a disclaimer at
the bottom of the website in smaller letters, indicating that the website's
purpose was simply to obtain information.66 The content of the website
also appeared at least once as a full-page advertisement in two local
newspapers. 67  Carmichael's attorney, Steve Glassroth, stated that the
purpose of the website was for Carmichael to gather information on his
case, and that the website yielded calls to his office from "time to
time. 68
(2000). 21 U.S.C. § 846 states, "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any
offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those
prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or
conspiracy." 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) states, "Any person who
conspires to commit any offense defined in this section [money laundering] or section
1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the
commission of which was the object of the conspiracy." 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2004).
59. At time of publication, the page was no longer available; however, a printed
copy of the website is on file with the author.
60. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1271. The district court determined, without
question, that Carmichael had control over the website. Id.
61. Id. at 1272.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. It should be noted that during the six months that this paper was being
written, the website changed in appearance several times.
65. Id.
66. Id. The disclaimer read, "This website, or any posters and advertisements
concerning the Carmichael Case, is definitely not an attempt to intimidate or harass any
informants or agents, but is simply an attempt to seek information. The Carmichael Case
will not be a 'closed door' case." Id.
67. Id. The newspapers which ran the advertisement were the Montgomery
Westside Weekly and the Montgomery-Tuskegee Times. Id. at 1275.
68. Jessica M. Walker, Carmichael Can Keep Website, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER,
(July, 21, 2004) available at http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com (follow link to
2006]
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On February 4, 2004, the government filed a motion for a protective
order, to prevent Carmichael from using the website to post statements
about evidence and harass witnesses in the case. 69 The magistrate judge
denied the order because there was insufficient evidence of harassment
or criminal intent.7°
After a third version of the website appeared, the government
renewed its motion for a protective order based on the website's
intimidating and obstructive content; this time, an evidentiary hearing
was granted.7'
B. Reasoning of the District Court
At the hearing, two of the informants pictured on the website
testified, as did a few DEA agents.72 Sherry D. Pettis claimed that the
website made her "fearful of what people might do to her," and that fear
had made her leave Alabama.73 Pettis further testified that although
Carmichael himself never threatened her, she had received threats from
other sources.74 Robert Patrick Denton testified that the website and
newspaper advertisement had "changed his life dramatically., 75  He
stated that a stranger had approached him at a restaurant and informed
newspaper archives).
69. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1273. The government cited 18 U.S.C. §
1514(b)(1) as its authority, which states,
A United States district court, upon motion of the attorney for the Government,
shall issue a protective order prohibiting harassment of a victim or witness in a
Federal criminal case if the court, after a hearing, finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that harassment of an identified victim or witness in a Federal criminal
case exists or that such order is necessary to prevent and restrain an offense under
section 1512 of this title, other than an offense consisting of misleading conduct,
or under section 1513 of this title.
18 U.S.C. § 1514(b)(1) (2004).
The government claimed that the protective order was necessary to restrain
Carmichael's harassment of witnesses to prevent their testimony under 18 U.S.C. §
1512(b)(1), which states, "Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens or
corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading
conduct toward another person, with intent to influence, delay or prevent the
testimony of any person in an official proceeding."
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) (2004).
70. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
71. Id. at 1274-75.
72. Id. at 1275.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
[Vol. 26:523
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him that Carmichael was trying to kill him; in addition, he had been
scared to let his children leave the house.76
DEA agents also testified as to the many detrimental effects of the
website. 7  They stated that photographs of agents could put them in
peril, as well as compromise their ability to work undercover.78 Agents
also testified that the website created an "atmosphere of intimidation"
surrounding the case, making witnesses less likely to come forward to
testify.79 DEA agent DeJohn specifically mentioned three witnesses who
informed the government of their decision not to testify after the website
was posted on the Internet.8 °
In his defense, Carmichael called one witness. 81 Dr. Mark Hickson,
a professor of communications at the University of Alabama at
Birmingham, testified that, in his opinion, there was nothing threatening
about the website.82 He stated that in his opinion, the website was
merely a way for Carmichael to get attention.83
The issue presented to the district court was whether the court may
order the defendant to take down an Internet website that the government
contends is threatening and harassing its witnesses and agents, when the
defendant contends that the website is a permissible exercise of his First
Amendment right to discuss his case. 84 The district court ruled that it has
the authority to shut down a website by virtue of both the federal statute
85
76. Id. Note, however, that the majority of Denton's testimony concerned the
newspaper articles. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1275-76.
81. Id. at 1276.
82. Id.
83. Id. Additionally, Carmichael objected to some of the government's arguments,
including the suggestion that he had threatened potential witnesses against him in the
past. Id. Apparently, in 1997, one of Carmichael's employees had been arrested while
driving a truck carrying 200 pounds of marijuana, and after paying his bond, inquired
from the bail bondsman whether he could get his money back if the employee were
killed. Id. The court refused to give the government's assertion any consideration, due to
the vague facts of the incident and the fact that Carmichael's comment was introduced
through triple hearsay. Id. This past history of threats from Carmichael directed at
potential witnesses against him should be important in considering whether the current
speech is a threat. If a subjective element were added to the true threat analysis, that
incident may have contributed to the fear of those pictured on the website.
84. Id. at 1270. Additionally, the issue of whether the website was permissible
since Carmichael had a Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to investigate his case and
prepare a defense was presented. Id. This issue will not be addressed in this Note.
85. Id. at 1277. See discussion of 18 U.S.C. § 1514(b)(1), supra note 69.
2006]
11
PACE LAWREVIEW
and the court's inherent power.86 However, Carmichael's website was
held to be a permissible exercise of his First Amendment freedom of
speech, not a true threat, and therefore the court refused to issue the
protective order to the government.
The court first addressed the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1514(b)(1)
to determine whether the website was a threat.88 There are two prongs
under this statute: the harassment prong and the 18 U.S.C. § 1512
prong.89  18 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(1) defines harassment as "a course of
conduct directed at a specific person that[:] (A) causes substantial
emotional distress in such person; and (B) serves no legitimate
purpose." 90  Although the continuing presence of the website could
arguably be considered a course of conduct, the court determined that
Carmichael's right to investigate his case serves some legitimate
purpose.91  Thus, the court concluded that the website was not
harassment under the first prong of the test.
92
Turning to the second prong, to establish a violation under 18
U.S.C. § 1512, the government must prove that Carmichael knowingly
intimidated or threatened another person and that he did so with the
intent to influence, delay, or prevent that person from testifying.93
However, the court's authority to act under § 1512 is restricted by the
First Amendment; the government may only shut down a website if it is
86. Carmichael, 290 F.3d 1058. The Court's inherent power comes from United
States v. Noriega, which stated,
(I]t is the trial judge's primary responsibility to govern judicial proceedings so as
to ensure that the accused receives a fair, orderly trial comporting with
fundamental due process. The trial judge is therefore granted broad discretion in
ordering the daily activities of his court. "A trial judge should have the authority
to adopt reasonable measures to avoid injury to the parties by reason of prejudicial
or inflammatory publicity." Within this discretion, therefore, the district judge can
place restrictions on parties, jurors, lawyers, and others involved with the
proceedings despite the fact that such restrictions might affect First Amendment
considerations. Sixth Amendment rights of the accused must be protected always.
United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal citations
omitted).
87. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
88. Id. at 1277-78.
89. Id.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1514(a), (b), (c)(l) (2004).
91. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1278. The court held that the website "may...
only barely" advance "a legitimate purpose." Id.
92. Id.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) (2000).
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a constitutionally unprotected true threat.94 If the website is found to be
protected speech, the court may only issue the protective order if the
government can do two things: demonstrate that its interest in protecting
its witnesses and agents outweighs Carmichael's right to free speech, and
satisfy the constitutional requirements for imposing prior restraints. 95
Since the United States Supreme Court has never defined "true
threat," the district court relied on the Eleventh Circuit's definition. 96 In
United States v. Alaboud,97 the Eleventh Circuit set out the following
standard for evaluating true threats: A communication is a threat when
"in its context [it] would 'have a reasonable tendency to create
apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor."' In other
words, the inquiry is whether there was "sufficient evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally made the
statement under such circumstances that a reasonable person would
construe them as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily
harm ....98  Thus, the offending remarks must be measured by an
objective standard.
Additionally, there are three factors to consider in order to
determine whether speech is a threat: (1) the language itself, (2) the
context in which the communication was made (i.e., would a reasonable
person construe it as a serious intention to inflict bodily harm?), and (3)
testimony by the recipient of the communication.99
In considering the first factor, the court examined the website itself
and determined that there was no explicit threat on the website, nor was
there anything threatening or intimidating about the request for
information.100 The court also noted that there was an explicit disclaimer
stating that the website was not intended to harass or intimidate,10 1 and
although the term "informant" used on the website has a negative
94. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.
95. Id. "'[P]rior restraint' is used 'to describe administrative and judicial orders
forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such
communications are to occur.' M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03, p.
4-14 (1984) (emphasis added). Temporary restraining orders and permanent
injunctions-i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech activities-are classic examples
of prior restraints." Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993).
96. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1280. The court noted that its objective
standard is similar to the objective tests used by a majority of the circuits. Id.
97. United States v. Alaboud, 347 F.3d 1293 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
98. Id. at 1296-97. (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
99. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1281.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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connotation, "[t]he First Amendment, however, does not prohibit name-
calling.' 0 2 Finally, the court distinguished the Seventh Circuit decision
of United States v. Khorrami,0 3 in which a WANTED poster was held to
be a true threat. The court held that Carmichael's website was not nearly
as threatening as the poster in that case.) 4
In examining the context of the website, the second factor in the
court's assessment, the court contrasted Carmichael's website with the
WANTED posters in Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life
Activists.10 5  The court quoted some of the language in the Planned
Parenthood decision to show how context is important:1
0 6
[I]t is use of the "wanted"-type format in the context of the poster pattern-
poster followed by murder-that constitutes the threat.... None of these
"WANTED" posters contained threatening language either .... wanted"-
type posters were intimidating and caused fear of serious harm to those
named on them .... In the context of the poster pattern, the posters were
precise in their meaning to those in the relevant community of reproductive
health service providers. They were a true threat.'
0 7
The court determined that because Carmichael's website was not
put up in the context of numerous murders of witnesses and government
agents linked to similar publications, the website was too dissimilar from
the WANTED posters and website in Planned Parenthood to be
considered a true threat.
0 8
102. Id. at 1282.
103. United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1990).
104. Carmichael, 326 F, Supp. 2d at 1281. Khorrami involved a WANTED poster
that was sent to the Jewish National Fund (JNF), a non-profit organization associated
with Israel. Khorrami, 895 F.2d at 1187-88. Numerous threatening phone calls and
letters were received by JNF over a six-month period, specifically mentioning killing
Jews. Id. at 1188. During this time, JNF received a WANTED poster featuring the
pictures of Israeli officials and JNF officials, with captions such as "Must be killed" next
to the photographs. Id. at 1189. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
emphasized the importance of the context of a statement in determining whether it is a
true threat. The Seventh Circuit examined whether the statement was made in a context
wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by the
listener as a serious expression of an intention to inflict harm. Id. at 1193. In the context
of six months of harassing and threatening phone calls and letters, the WANTED poster
was determined to be a true threat, because a reasonable jury could conclude that JNF
would interpret the poster as a serious intention to inflict harm upon them. Id.
105. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1282. See discussion of Planned Parenthood
v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), supra Part III.
106. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1283-84.
107. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1085.
108. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.
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The court went on to acknowledge that the website looks more like
a threat when viewed in light of the general history of informants being
killed in drug-conspiracy cases,'0 9 and when noting the historical
connotation of WANTED posters, which suggested that the person
pictured was wanted "dead or alive."" 0  However, when applying the
reasonable person standard, these acknowledgments were insufficient to
make the website a true threat; the government presented insufficient
evidence that Carmichael had actually threatened any of the witnesses or
that there was a context in which the court could infer a threat."' It was
also noted briefly that the fact that the WANTED poster was on the
Internet was not enough to make it a threat; the court used the United
States Supreme Court's ruling that speech on the Internet is subject to the
same constitutional protection as all other media, and the general rule
that speech broadcast to a larger audience is less likely to be a true
threat.'12
It should be noted that, in a footnote, the court discussed how
Carmichael himself is a convicted murderer." 13 The record of the hearing
was almost devoid of facts about the conviction, except that he was
eventually pardoned.' 14 Therefore, since it had little to go on, the court
refused to rely heavily on the murder conviction in the analysis of
whether the website was a threat in the context of the speech. 1 5 Perhaps
if the court had employed a more subjective test, this murder conviction
would have played a more substantial role determining if those pictured
on the website would actually feel threatened.
For the most part, the court disregarded the testimony of the victims
of the website, those agents and informants pictured. 16 While the court
acknowledged that the testimony of Denton and Pettis, two of the
informants pictured, was "certainly some evidence that the
www.carmichaelcase.com website is a threat,"' 1 7 the fact that there was
evidence of other causes of their fear overshadowed that evidence."18
Apparently, the existence of other possible witnesses who were not
109. Id. at 1285.
110. Id. at 1286.
111. Id. at 1288.
112. Id. at 1288-89.
113. Id. at 1285 n.42.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1289-90.
117. Id. at 1289.
118. Id.
2006]
15
PACE LAW REVIEW
pictured on the website, yet still refused to testify, indicated that there
was a general atmosphere of intimidation around the case." 9 Also, the
court noted that, "[I]t seems likely in any big drug-conspiracy case like
this that witnesses would be anxious and possibly afraid."' 120  So in
essence, the court disregarded the testimony of Denton and Pettis
regarding their fear because they were expected to be afraid, with or
without the website. Agent DeJohn's testimony about three other
pictured witnesses refusing to cooperate was also disregarded because
none of them indicated that their decision was related to the website,
even though they expressed concern about its existence.
121
The testimony of various DEA agents was even less persuasive to
the court, since the agents' main concern was whether the website would
compromise their safety and ability to work undercover, which the court
held is not evidence of a threat. 122 The court stated that the testimony of
witnesses, agents, and informants was not determinative because the test
it must employ is an objective one.' 23 This is the wrong test to be using
when it forces the court to completely disregard the fear caused in the
recipient.
The court concluded that the government did not satisfy its burden
of showing that Carmichael's website is unprotected speech, and
therefore the website is presumptively speech protected by the First
Amendment. 24 The court concluded that the website was not a true
threat, was outside of the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 1512, and denied the
government's motion for a protective order. 25 Additionally, the court
refused to order Carmichael to take down his website because the
government had not met its burden of proving that a prior restraint on
Carmichael's speech was warranted.
26
Two days after the Carmichael decision was handed down, the
district court issued a second opinion on the matter, this time concerning
newspaper advertisements containing the same content as the websites.
127
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1289-90.
124. Id. at 1290.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1270. Further analysis of the prior restraint issue may be found in Part
III (B)(2) of the Carmichael decision, but will not be discussed in detail here.
127. United States v. Carmichael (Carmichael I), 326 F. Supp. 2d. 1303, 1304
(M.D. Ala. 2004).
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The government had renewed its motion for the protective order to apply
to the full-page advertisement in the Montgomery Westside Weekly and
other newspapers, but the district court maintained that the same analysis
given to the website applies to the print ads as well. 28 The district court
stated in its opinion, "There is no reason to reach a different conclusion
regarding Carmichael's newspaper advertisements because the First
Amendment analysis does not turn on the medium involved. The
[district] court explicitly declined to find the fact that a website was at
issue constitutionally significant.' 29 The newspaper advertisement was
determined not to be a true threat either, and the motion was once again
denied. 30
V. Analysis of United States v. Carmichael
The purpose of the objective test is clear: to prevent a jury from
considering a listener's unique sensitivity when evaluating language
under the true threat framework. The policy reasons behind this test are
valid, and there are certainly arguments to be made that protected speech
would cease to exist if a jury were allowed to consider subjective
feelings of the listener in every threat case that appears. But maybe this
test is outdated in regard to this new medium. Perhaps the Internet
should not be considered under a traditional First Amendment analysis,
because in reality, it is very different from other media.13 1 Courts need to
recognize that the Internet is significantly different from a local
newspaper or a statement from one person to another. And as such, the
subjective feelings of the listener should not be disregarded completely.
The Internet is a vast marketplace for ideas, making strong First
Amendment protection important. However, this marketplace also
provides huge potential for abuse, by allowing threats to be heard by a
much larger audience. The Carmichael court erred when it determined
that speech broadcast to a larger audience is less likely to be a true
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1304-05.
131. Traditional mediums of mass communication fall under the regulation of the
Federal Communications Commission, but there is very little formal governmental
regulation of the Internet. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868-69
(1997). The Internet is primarily regulated by Internet Service Providers themselves,
which have much discretion in editing or censoring what is being broadcast on their
servers. Id. at 850-5 1.
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threat. 132  Although this statement makes sense in the context of a
political speech addressed to thousands of people, 33 the same does not
apply in the context of the Internet.
In People v. Neuman,134 the California Court of Appeal held that a
WANTED-style website was indeed a true threat. 135  Alan Russell
Neuman had created a website about Ventura Police Officer Rodney
Giles after he was cited for several traffic violations and his car was
impounded. 136 The website featured a description of Officer Giles and
the included the words "WANTED! Dead or Alive! (Reward) .... ,137
Using the test that the Ninth Circuit has adopted, the court found that a
reasonable person would foresee that the context and import of the words
would have caused Officer Giles to believe that he would be subject to
physical violence, and therefore the website was not protected speech.1
38
By using this test, the court was able to consider the fact that
"[w]hen Giles learned about the 'WANTED' notice, and was informed
that appellant had posted it, he became concerned for his and his family's
safety."' 139 The court found that the website was an unequivocal threat
aimed at harming Giles, and the threat resembled the WANTED website
addressed in United States v. Khorrami.1
40
Neuman argued that the threat was not adequately communicated to
Officer Giles because it was buried in an obscure website, and therefore
could not be a delivered threat under the statute. 14 1 The court responded
by making special note of the fact that a WANTED poster on the Internet
cannot be considered "buried" when it is prominently posted on a
132. United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1289 (M.D. Ala 2004).
133. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), in which the Supreme Court
held that the speech was mere political hyperbole addressed to a large audience rather
than a true threat.
134. People v. Neuman, No. CR46739, 2002 WL 800516, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr.
30, 2002).
135. Id. at *4.
136. Id. at*1.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *3-5. The website was altered by Neuman two times, both after being
contacted by Ventura Police Department employees using assumed names, inquiring
about the website. Id. at *4-5. The second modification included the removal of the
"Dead or Alive" language, and the addition of a disclaimer that the website was "'a
political statement designed to shock the People of Ventura' and was not intended to
promote violence against Officer Giles." Id. at *2 (quoting from defendant's website).
139. Id. at *1.
140. Id. at *4. For a discussion of the Khorrami case, see supra note 104.
141. Neuman, 2002 WL 800516, at *4. The statute at issue is CAL. PENAL CODE §
422 (West 1999), prohibiting threats by means of electronic communication. Id.
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website "accessible to millions of Internet users."' 142  This is a more
realistic interpretation of speech on the Internet, in contrast with the
views of the Carmichael court. Rather than telling a few friends about
his feelings for Officer Giles, he made a website that had the potential to
be seen by millions of people.
Although Neuman has a number of factual differences from
Carmichael, such as the addition of the words "Dead or Alive!" and the
promise of a reward, the premise is basically the same. By putting
someone's name, picture, and personal information on a WANTED
poster, there is the inference that the person must be brought to justice,
with force if necessary. Anyone who sees themselves on such a website
would be concerned and feel threatened, as Officer Giles was here, and
as Denton and Pettis testified that they were in the Carmichael case. By
acknowledging that the Internet is a vast medium that reaches millions of
people, and by using a test that considers whether the victim would feel
threatened, the California court came to the proper conclusion in the
Neuman case.
The anonymity of the Internet allows people to threaten and harass
when they actually have no intention of acting on their statements;
however, the recipients of these messages can rarely distinguish the real
threats from the jokes. People feel that they can get away with more
using the medium of the Internet, but the victims of online harassment
probably feel just as threatened as they would if the threats were made in
person. Victims may even feel more threatened because the threats can
be more widely dispersed.
From a simple Internet search, it became apparent that the
Carmichael case was important news to many people. It was referenced
in many online discussion forums, as well as in websites concerning
other subject matters, most relating to drugs. 143 This alone demonstrates
142. Id. A computer expert for the prosecution had testified that the website had
been indexed on three Internet search engines, which referenced the site when key words
such as "liberty" and "freedom" were entered. Id. The website was also part of a
webring, the "Christian Common Law Webring," which allowed Neuman's website to be
linked to other websites belonging to the group. Id.
143. One such website was http://www.thcseeds.com, a website devoted to the sale
of marijuana seeds and other marijuana paraphernalia. This website featured an article
about the Carmichael case, with commentary stating the hope that this trend of exposing
"two-faced narcs" continues. THC Seeds.com, USA: It's O.K. to Expose Snitches and
Narcs on Your Website, Court Rules!!! (Sept. 24, 2004), http://www.thcseeds.com
/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=998. It seems that the case has found much
support with the pro-drug community, as numerous other drug-related websites featured
articles about the Carmichael case, and all seemed to hail it as a victorious battle in the
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the far-reaching effects of the Internet; people all over the United States,
as well as the world, are now aware of Carmichael's website and the
people who are pictured on it. Had the WANTED poster simply
appeared in the local Montgomery, Alabama newspaper, people all over
the United States would have no interest in, and no knowledge of, the
names and photographs of the informants and agents involved, unless, of
course, the story was picked up by CNN. But since the controversy has
been embraced by the anti-drug-war organizations, the website and the
court decisions have been published on many other websites. This has
exponentially increased the number of people who would have simply
seen Carmichael's website.
Another example of how this type of website can have far-reaching
effects is demonstrated by the website entitled "Who's a Rat." 144 This
website claims to be the largest online database of informants and
agents. 145 Interestingly enough, the website has a section of the home
page entitled "Rats of the Week." At one point in time, Robert Denton,
one of the informants in the Carmichael case, was pictured in that
section. 146 His picture and information was posted on the website by
Carmichael himself.147 While the stated purpose of this website is to
provide information to assist attorneys and criminal defendants with few
ongoing war against the so called "War on Drugs." See Suburbia Website, Newsbrief"
Defendant Can Post Pictures of Narcotics Agents in Info Search, Federal Court Says
(Aug. 6, 2004), http://staticfiends.com (follow "suburbia message boards" hyperlink; then
follow "news to me" hyperlink); Stop the Drug War Website, Two Web Sites Now Online
Are Naming Names and Seeking Info on Narcs and Snitches (Aug. 27, 2004),
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/351/names.shtml.
144. Who's a Rat Website, http://www.whosarat.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
145. Id. The website also includes the following disclaimer:
THIS WEBSITE DOES NOT PROMOTE OR CONDONE VIOLENCE OR ILLEGAL
ACTIVITY AGAINST INFORMANTS OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. IF
YOU POST ANYTHING ANYWHERE ON THIS SITE RELATING TO VIOLENCE
OR ILLEGAL ACTIVITY AGAINST INFORMANTS OR OFFICERS YOUR POST
WILL BE REMOVED AND YOU WILL BE BANNED FROM THIS WEBSITE, IF
YOU ARE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OR WORK FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND
YOU HAVE PRIVILEGED INFORMATION THAT HAS NOT BEEN MADE PUBLIC
AT SOME POINT TO AT LEAST 1 PERSON OF THE PUBLIC DO NOT POST IT.
ALL POSTS MADE BY USERS SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH A GRAIN OF SALT
UNLESS BACKED BY OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. PLEASE POST INFORMANTS
THAT ARE INVOLVED WITH NON-VIOLENT CRIMES ONLY.
Who's a Rat Website, http://www.whosarat.com/aboutus.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
146. Who's a Rat Website, http://www.whosarat.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
147. Who's a Rat Website, http://www.whosarat.com/preview-informant.php?
id=MTE (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
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resources,148 there is something bothersome about posting pictures of
people under the moniker "rat." While both this website and
Carmichael's website claim that they do not advocate the use of violence
against those pictured, this does not mean that no violence will befall
these people. The chance of family, friends, or even loyal followers of
convicted criminals seeking revenge increases with every new website
that makes it easier for them to find out on whom to seek revenge.
The Sixth Circuit has ruled that unless a threat is objectively viewed
as transmitted for the purpose of intimidation, then it is unlikely that the
recipient will actually feel threatened himself.149 The court also stated
"Although it may offend our sensibilities, a communication... cannot
constitute a threat unless the communication also is conveyed for the
purpose of furthering some goal through the use of intimidation.'
150
Viewed alone, Carmichael's website could easily pass this objective
intimidation test. Indeed, the Carmichael court concluded from the
testimony of the informants and agents that there was an "atmosphere of
intimidation" surrounding the case.' 51 And when the website is viewed
along with websites such as "Who's a Rat," it is clear that by posting the
pictures, Carmichael wanted to dissuade these people from testifying
against him. Because Carmichael was using the website as a means to
further his own goals through intimidation, this should factor in the
determination that his website is a true threat.
The Carmichael court did not believe that Carmichael was going to
carry out any violence against those pictured on the website,152 but
perhaps the court did not give enough weight to the harm that threats
cause listeners. United States Supreme Court Justice Marshall,
concurring in the Rogers decision, stated,
Plainly, threats may be costly and dangerous to society in a variety of ways,
even when their authors have no intention whatever of carrying them out.
Like a threat to blow up a building, a serious threat on the President's life is
enormously disruptive and involves substantial costs to the Government. A
threat made with no present intention of carrying it out may still restrict the
President's movements and require a reaction from those charged with
148. Who's a Rat Website, http://www.whosarat.com/disclaimer.php (last visited
Feb. 2, 2006).
149. United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1496, 1997 Fed.App. 0036P (6th
Cir. 1997).
150. Id. at 1495.
151. United States v Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1289 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
152. Id. at 1281.
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protecting the President.1
53
Although those pictured on Carmichael's website were certainly not
the President of the United States or other people who require Secret
Service protection, the point is that threats, even ones that the speaker
has no intention of carrying out, disrupt the lives of the recipient.
Threats are harmful to society, and the burdens that they cause, such as
when they may prevent an undercover DEA agent from performing his
duties, need to be prevented.
The Carmichael court did not place enough weight on the context of
the situation. In Planned Parenthood,1 54 despite the shocking facts
detailed above, an ordinary person may have found that that material on
the website was not threatening. But because the court allowed the
context to be considered, including the alarming amount of abortion
clinic violence and murders of abortion doctors, the ordinary person was
able to see how these Internet threats could have been particularly
threatening to those abortion doctors pictured on the website.' 55 Had the
Carmichael court given serious consideration to the testimony of the
agents and informants pictured on Carmichael's website demonstrating
their fear of harm, to the evidence of the atmosphere of intimidation
surrounding the case, and to the fact that Carmichael was not only a well-
connected drug-dealer but also a convicted murderer, the result in the
case may have been different.
In making its decision, the Carmichael court claimed that it was
relying on an over-protective analysis, stating,
If the court permits the site to remain up and a witness or agent is harmed,
the court will be blamed for predicting incorrectly. However, if the court
restricts or prohibits Carmichael's site, few will even be able to judge
whether the court predicted accurately because the site will no longer be
available in the same form, if at all. Thus, the safest course for the court is
to over-predict the danger posed by Carmichael's site. Indeed, when
confronted with a conflict between the public safety and an individual's
rights, it is almost always going to be most comfortable to err on the side of
public safety.
15 6
But this is not what the court did. If the court really "over-
predicted" the danger of the website, it would have determined that it
153. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975) (Marshall, J. concurring).
154. Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.
2002) (en banc).
155. Id. at 1088.
156. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
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was a threat. Erring on the side of public safety should not have resulted
in allowing the website to remain as is. At the very end of its opinion,
the court noted that "a few differences in Carmichael's site could have
changed the court's calculus,' 57 but the court does not specifically state
what these differences were. When a "few differences" would have
made the court determine that the website was a true threat, and the court
claimed that it was going to favor public safety over individual rights, the
result here does not make sense. If the court wanted to protect public
safety it should have determined that Carmichael's website, which
caused numerous informants and agents to fear for the safety of
themselves and their families, was a true threat. Such an "over-
protective" analysis should have resulted in a more conservative result.
VI. The Proposed Test
Although it is important that free speech rights not be chilled on the
Internet, it is also important that this new medium not be used as a
method of threatening others. If threats are allowed to be delivered in
cyberspace, this will inevitably lead to a decline in the exercise of free
speech; if those who speak fear retaliation for their beliefs, they will be
less likely to contribute to the marketplace of ideas that comprises the
Internet. This is precisely the opposite goal of the crusaders of the First
Amendment.
As the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan stated in
United States v. Baker, "[N]ew technology such as the Internet may
complicate analysis and may sometimes require new or modified
laws... ,,158 A new test for true threats, one that incorporates a
subjective component, should be used in the context of the Internet. A
more subjective test would allow for the fear caused in the proposed
victim to be taken into account. Other circuits, as well as the Supreme
Court, should take notice of the test used by the First and the Ninth
Circuits. These circuits have ruled that the test is whether a reasonable
speaker would foresee that the listener would interpret the speech as a
threat of violence. Regardless of whether the speaker actually intended
to carry out the threat, a jury will be able to inquire as to whether a
157. Id.
158. United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1390 (E.D. Mich. 1995). In Baker,
the defendant was convicted of transmitting threats to injure or kidnap another through e-
mail messages transmitted via the Internet. Id. at 1378-79. The e-mails expressed an
interest in sexual violence against women and girls. Id. at 1379.
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reasonable person would hear the words (or read them on the Internet)
and believe that a threat was made against them. 159 The focus is on
whether a threat was made, not whether there was intent to actually
execute the threat. This test will allow for free speech rights to continue,
with greater protection for those against whom Internet threats are made.
The Supreme Court should follow the lead of the First Circuit,
which has ruled that in true threat cases, the test allows evidence of the
recipient's reaction to demonstrate the likely reaction of a reasonable
listener. 160 In United States v. Fulmer, the First Circuit stated, "[S]tate-
of-mind evidence will be most relevant to th[e] question [of whether
there was an attempt to frighten] where the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that his actions would produce such a
state of mind in the victim.''61 The reaction of the actual recipient is
probative of whether the speaker might reasonably foresee that the
statement would be interpreted as a threat. 162  Additionally, the court
noted that even though the reaction is relevant, it may sometimes be
excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 163 if it causes
unfair prejudice.164 The court in Fulmer correctly decided that it is
helpful to consider the recipient's reaction as evidence of how someone
involved in the situation would have interpreted the threat.
To employ a more subjective test is not to revisit times in our early
history when people were prosecuted for their thoughts alone. 165 This
159. In Lovell v. Poway Unified School District, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit considered a number of factors in analyzing speech under the objective-subjective
standard of a reasonable person in the speaker's position foreseeing that the statement
would be interpreted as a true threat. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367,
372 (9th Cir. 1996). The court considered the entire factual context of the alleged threats,
which included the surrounding events and the reaction of listeners, as well as whether
the threat was unconditional, unequivocal, specific, and immediate enough to
demonstrate the gravity of the purpose. Id. In this case, the court determined that when a
10th grade student had threatened to shoot her guidance counselor if the counselor did not
make her requested changes to her schedule, that statement was indeed a true threat. Id.
This decision was reached by considering the comment in the context of the increasing
amount of violence in schools at the time. Id.
160. United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1500 (1st Cir. 1997).
161. Id. (quoting United States v. Goodoak, 836 F.2d 708, 712 (1st Cir. 1988)).
162. Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1500.
163. Rule 403 states, "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
164. Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1500.
165. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 710 (1969) for a discussion of the
Alien and Sedition Acts.
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test is not intended to apply to political speech. When speech is
obviously political, aimed at public figures or the government in general
such as the speech in the Watts166 case, a reasonable person would not
interpret the speech as a threat of violence because of the hyperbolic
nature of political speech. But when the speech is aimed at particular
people, such as the informants on Carmichael's website, the subjective
element will allow these people the protection that they deserve.
This test will address important public policy concerns about free
speech, such as preventing unjustified inhibition of free speech. It will
not have a chilling effect on free speech, because when addressed to an
audience at large and not intended to target particular individuals and
entities, statements that border on being interpreted as threats would be
protected because no specific listeners would perceive the statements as
threats. 1
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The Supreme Court must establish a test to be used uniformly
among the circuits. Increased use of the Internet will give rise to more
and more litigation based on threatening websites and emails. Having a
consistent standard to use will facilitate the conclusion of such cases.
VII. Conclusion
The Internet is arguably the most powerful and influential media
outlet in the world. Any given website is available for viewing by
anyone in the world with a computer. A threat transmitted over the
Internet can be read by many more people than a threat placed in a
newspaper or spoken on the radio.168 For many reasons, the Internet is
completely different from any other form of media, and it should not be
treated the same. Because the threats on Carmichael's website were
accessible by so many people, the district court erred by not taking into
account whether the victims would interpret the website as a threat.
There was an atmosphere of intimidation surrounding the case, which
involved a drug dealer who had previously been convicted of murder.
The clear purpose of the website was to harass those testifying against
166. See Watts, 384 U.S. 705.
167. Anna S. Andrews, When is a Threat "Truly" a Threat Lacking First
Amendment Protection? A Proposed True Threats Test to Safeguard Free Speech Rights
in the Age of the Internet, THE UCLA ONLINE INSTITUTE FOR CYBERSPACE L. AND POL'Y
(May 1999), http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/aandrews2.htm.
168. Jennifer L. Brenner, Note, True Threats-A More Appropriate Standard for
Analyzing First Amendment Protection and Free Speech When Violence is Perpetrated
Over the Internet, 78 N.D. L. REv. 753, 783 (2002).
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Carmichael, and the court should not have determined that the website
was protected speech under the First Amendment. By using a strictly
objective test and not giving much weight to the context in which the
website was viewed, the court reached the wrong conclusion.
Treating threats transmitted over the Internet differently, by
applying a hybrid objective-subjective test rather than the pure objective
test that most circuits use to analyze true threats, will allow the Internet's
unique characteristics to be taken into consideration. This way, when
someone you have angered puts your name, picture, and personal
information on a website, accessible by millions of people who may
agree with those who hold a grudge against you, the court will be able to
take your interpretation of the threat into consideration.
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss2/6
